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2013, 280pp., $14.95, ISBN 978-1939578099 (paperback) Foreword by 
Michael Shermer.
A Manual for Creating Atheists (hereafter, “the Manu-
al”) is a training guidebook for curing those “contam-
inated” with what Boghossian calls “the faith virus.” It 
is replete with pithy aphorisms, guidelines, strategies, 
talking points, dialectical examples and analyses of re-
al-life “interventions” designed to progressively tutor 
armies of atheist evangelists in the art of demolishing 
faith, which Boghossian claims is “pretending to know 
things one doesn’t know.”
Boghossian analyzes faith as a viral complex of path-
ogenic memes designed to inculcate “doxastic closure” 
– reason-insensitivity. The Manual reads like a bulletin 
from the Centers for Disease Control, a citizens’ how-
to guide designed to enable millions-strong armies of 
‘street’ epistemologists to eradicate faith, “ushering in 
a new Enlightenment and Age of Reason” (17-18). He 
views this as the next step in a movement initiated by 
the “Four Horsemen” of atheism: Sam Harris, Richard 
Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, and Christopher Hitchens.
The book is not a collection of metaphysical arguments 
about the non-existence of God. Boghossian includes 
many arguments about the irrationality of faith and 
counterarguments against theists’ typical defenses, but 
advises street epistemologists against lending credibil-
ity to the metaphysical issue of God’s existence, as if 
there are two sides to it. Boghossian takes it for grant-
ed that there are no good reasons for faith, and most 
who would purchase the Manual likely agree. Rather, 
those infected with the faith virus need to be engaged 
epistemologically: directed through Socratic inquiry 
to acknowledge their pretending to know what they 
don’t know, to accept aporia, uncertainty. Anyone con-
taminated by the faith virus presents the street episte-
mologist with an opportunity for a Socratic interven-
tion – on planes, bank lines, at doctor’s office waiting 
areas, etc. 
Boghossian provides a variety of useful insights, strat-
egies, and clues about how to bring about doxastic 
openness, the opposite of doxastic closure, often il-
lustrating them through actual intervention dialogues 
he has held with hosts of the faith virus. Although 
Boghossian avoids metaphysics, I found many useful 
things to take from the Manual into my philosophy 
of religion and related classes. And while he makes 
no attempt to make the book “balanced” (because that 
would be like debating with Creationists), the book 
(or parts of it) could play a useful role in an introduc- 
tory philosophy, philosophy of religion, or epistemol- 
ogy class.
Boghossian’s emphasis on epistemology as the anti-
dote to faith rings true in my own case. What drew me 
to philosophy as a teenager were personal mystical ex-
periences I could not explain on the materialist view: 
out-of-body experiences, multiply-complex precog-
nitive dreams, and deep altered states in meditation. 
I thought philosophy would provide the conceptual 
sophistication to explain the metaphysically unusual 
underpinnings of these powerfully noetic experiences. 
To my chagrin, my first epistemology class – which 
did not address these sorts of experiences at all – cast 
doubt on my gnostic sense of absolute certainty, the 
veracity of my memories, and the extent to which my 
experiences were as theoretically unbiased as I previ-
ously believed. Indirect epistemological inquiry led to 
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loss of faith, but it took years of self-inquiry before I 
could say I have shifted – fairly stably – from gnostic 
to agnostic. 
Thus, I have doubts about how successful this meth-
odology will be with the person on the street. The en-
counters Boghossian prescribes for his army of street 
epistemologists are relatively short-lived exchanges. I 
have a semester-long captive audience with my phi-
losophy of religion students, I am in charge of the 
discussion, I support it with readings, quizzes, essays, 
PowerPoints, videos, exams, and social media tools 
and I reward students for detecting and responding 
to my expectations, often to no avail with the faithful. 
Boghossian suggests what many academics often tell 
ourselves, that we are planting seeds. He claims that 
the more vehemently our interlocutors resist the im-
plications of our lines of inquiry, this is a diagnostic 
sign that the remedy is beginning to work; but this 
sounds, ironically, more like an article of faith than an 
empirically-supported diagnostic indicator.
Boghossian supports many of his claims with refer-
ences to published materials in relevant domains, such 
as social science studies of cult deprogramming data 
and the like, but another irony is that he has a ready 
answer for the evidential gaps peppered throughout: 
the fact that social science research is conducted un-
der the oversight of institutional review boards that 
frown on treating faith as a pathology, for  a variety 
of cultural reasons he exposes and disentangles quite 
deftly, ranging from the widely accepted perception 
of faith and unshakeable conviction as virtues to the 
hands-off autonomy and dignity relativistically af-
forded to individuals’ beliefs. This is ironically some-
what unfalsifiable, at least to date.
Boghossian outlines a variety of what he describes as 
“containment strategies” that go beyond the one-on-
one chance-encounters to be expected of his street 
epistemologists, going so far as to insist that faith-
based delusions be introduced into the Diagnostic 
Statistical Manual for mental illnesses, thereby en-
abling serious social science research into the caus-
es and cures of the faith virus, and that our society 
eliminate the tax exemptions afforded to religious 
institutions that are not afforded to other non-prof-
its. He even appeals to his readers to not purchase 
books by the faithful, so as to economically weaken 
the power of “vectors”, seemingly symptomless car-
riers of the faith virus, to spread it to others. To the 
extent Boghossian uses the language of contamina-
tion, virus, disease, pathology, diagnosis, prescription, 
containment, intervention, vector, and the like, his 
perspective on faith as a doxastic pathogen is at least 
entertaining and at best enlightening. His stance is 
so strictly non-negotiable that it instinctively elicit-
ed my underdog-protecting proclivities, despite that 
I looked initially to the Manual for help dealing with 
doxastically closed theists, and despite his explicit ad-
vice to street epistemologists to remain light-hearted 
precisely so as to evade this reflex reaction.
In defense of the allegedly contaminated, then, to 
speak in my own idioms a bit, let me note some 
weaknesses in Boghossian’s Manual. One thing I find 
difficult to accept is Boghossian’s insistence that ag-
nosticism is unjustifiable. His cavalier rejection of this 
position rests on the following analogy: He is not a 
Santa Claus agnostic, but a Santa Claus atheist. But 
this analogy is faulty, for whereas only children (and 
perhaps a few doxastically challenged adults) have 
ever believed in Santa Claus, Boghossian’s claim that 
no argument for God’s existence has stood the test 
of time is not on par with the case against Santa. The 
multitude of complex concepts of divinity and su-
pernature throughout history and across cultures, in-
cluding contemporary thought, renders the God case 
much more complex than it would be if all we meant 
by the God-concept was the Abrahamic concept. As 
Protagoras put it, life is too short and the subject is 
too complex to know one way or the other. 
In a league with Boghossian’s rejection of agnosticism 
is his somewhat cavalier description of the atheist as 
one who would believe in God if shown good evi-
dence, for example, if Jesus were to come down from 
the sky, walk on water, and so forth. Sure, in principle 
an atheist is an atheist because she is an evidentialist 
and has found negative evidence for God’s existence 
(such as the extent of evil and imperfection in what 
appears to be a stupidly designed world) and/or the 
absence of positive evidence for his existence (say, real 
miracles); as an evidentialist, she must say that the 
evidence could indicate that there is a God, and that 
if it did, she would become a theist. Of course, this 
much makes sense. But as William James implied, 
the atheist might be so doxastically closed to the very 
possibility of evidence that it is not a cognitively open 
or “live” option for her, such that she systematically 
ignores data that could count as evidence, for exam-
ple, the sorts of experiences that led me to philosophy. 
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Ockham’s Razor and error theories might be enough 
to presently dispel positive theistic conclusions based 
on such claims per se, but that is not the same thing 
as justifying the idea that such matters are not worthy 
of empirical investigation. Nor does it close options 
that render agnosticism an empirically viable posi-
tion. Perhaps Boghossian is unconsciously taking the 
negotiator’s strategy of starting off from the extreme 
atheist position so that after some negotiating what 
remains is still desirable, whereas starting from agnos-
ticism leaves little wiggle room; perhaps not.
Another, related objection is to both of Boghossian’s 
definitions of faith. Let’s focus first on the definition 
of “faith” as “pretending to know what one doesn’t 
know.” I have mixed feelings about this. On the one 
hand, I found it interesting to take his challenge to 
simply substitute the phrase “pretend to know” in 
place of occurrences of the word “faith” wherever they 
occur. For example, followers of the 14th Dalai Lama 
pretend to know that he is the reincarnation of the 
13th Dalai Lama, himself the reincarnation of the 12th, 
and so on. Catholics pretend to know that the com-
munion wafer is metaphysically identical to the flesh 
of Jesus. As much as this was sort of fun, it strikes me 
as some sort of cross between the straw man falla-
cy and the fallacy of persuasive definition. It’s a straw 
man because many who use the word “faith” would 
deny that they are pretending to know what it is they 
have faith in. For example, some intellectually hon-
est believers readily admit that faith is belief in the 
absence of the sort of evidence or reasons for believ-
ing that work to constitute knowledge. They believe 
despite lacking sufficient evidence. Boghossian tries 
to account for this by saying that “faith” and “hope” 
are not synonyms. He poses a “thought challenge” to 
prove this: “Give me a sentence where one must use the 
word ‘faith,’ and cannot replace that with ‘hope,’ yet at the 
same time isn’t an example of pretending to know some-
thing one doesn’t know” (26). 
I’m not sure about the methodological validity of this 
“thought challenge” because many do use the word 
“faith” to imply some possibly blended combination 
of doxastic and motivational elements; for example, “I 
don’t know if there is life after death or if spirituality 
matters at all because I have insufficient evidence to 
think I know that it does, and I certainly do hope that 
it does, so I take a risk with a leap of faith and live 
my life as if it does.” Whether hope is part of that 
or not can be separated from the thought challenge 
simply by removing “and I certainly hope that it does,” 
but inserting it doesn’t violate my semantic intuitions, 
and nothing here seems to involve me pretending to 
know something I don’t, so I don’t see a real challenge 
here. Sophisticated theists don’t need to think hope is 
an evidential reason for believing, although they may 
think it is a pragmatic reason for believing, and the 
more sophisticated among them would not claim that 
it counts as some form of knowledge; nor would they 
pretend that in hoping or having faith that they know 
something they pointedly don’t. Thus, Boghossian’s 
analysis and its substitution test fail. As for the fallacy 
of persuasive definition, it begs the question to define 
key terms in a debate in such a (persuasive) way that 
the disputed conclusion one seeks follows from one’s 
stipulated definition by fiat, as it were. A sample case 
that exhibits the fallacious nature of persuasive defi-
nition would involve defining a “fetus” as an “unborn 
person” such that the pro-life conclusion that “abor-
tion is murder” follows from the definition together 
with otherwise innocuous premises about abortion 
involving the killing of an innocent person, and so on. 
Thus, by defining “faith” as “pretending to know what 
one doesn’t know,” Boghossian guarantees that faith 
is, as he puts it, a faulty epistemology.
The other definition of “faith” Boghossian offers is 
“belief without evidence,” which in itself is fine, but in 
explicating this he says things like “‘faith’ is the word 
one uses when one does not have enough evidence to 
justify holding a belief, but when one just goes ahead 
and believes anyway” or that it is “an irrational leap 
over the probabilities” (24). On a fairly minimal ac-
count of what a belief is, we can suppose it is some-
thing like “a thought one thinks is true.” I often think 
things are true – that is, I have beliefs – in the absence 
of enough evidence to justify my holding of those 
thoughts that I take to be true. I think it is true that 
my file cabinet is still in my office, though I haven’t 
been to the campus in over a week, I have no webcam 
aiming a live feed at it, I have not received verification 
from any colleagues, and so forth. I would not claim 
to know it is there because I know that I could be 
wrong. But I believe it’s there. Boghossian can say I 
have sufficient evidence to believe it, and that the be-
lief does not involve an irrational leap over the proba-
bilities. It’s probably true that the file cabinet is there, 
so my belief is justified. But many of my beliefs are 
not as justified as is my file cabinet belief. It seems to 
butcher my use of the word “faith” to say that I have 
faith in these things. Of course, if Boghossian puts the 
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weight on the “irrational” element in “irrational leap 
over the probabilities,” then that strikes me as another 
blend of fallacies -- straw man and circularity: straw 
man because that’s not what pragmatists mean when 
they use the term, and circularity because the conclu-
sion that faith is irrational is built into the explication 
of the definition. 
For one advocating epistemology for the multitudes 
on the streets, I’m surprised at these somewhat slop-
py uses of key concepts in Boghossian’s atheism ar-
senal. Consider how belief has dropped out of his 
“belief without evidence” definition, to be replaced 
by knowledge: “If one claims knowledge either in the 
absence of evidence, or when a claim is contradicted 
by evidence, then this is when the word ‘faith’ is used. 
‘Believing something anyway’ is an accurate definition 
of the term ‘faith’” (24). No doubt, some theists use 
the term “faith” in this way, and many are doxastical-
ly closed, but most of my encounters with theists do 
not support the view that they employ the term as 
a knowledge operator, but rather as an insufficient-
ly-justified-belief operator. 
Another objection is that Boghossian seems to equiv-
ocate when he claims, on one hand, that for street 
epistemologists performing interventions “the core of 
the intervention is not changing beliefs, but changing the 
way people form beliefs” (72), but, on the other hand, 
the whole point of the book – reflected in its title – is 
to convert theists into atheists: to get people to change 
from their belief that there is a God to the belief that 
there is no God. It is strategic to focus on changing 
from a faulty epistemology to a more coherent one, 
but if one intends the result to be Creating Atheists, it 
is misleading to claim that an improved epistemology 
is the core goal. If it is, however, then the title is mis-
leading. One or the other must be adjusted.
Let us wind this review down with some positives. I 
mentioned earlier that this book contains few argu-
ments against God’s existence, but many against faith. 
Here’s a paraphrase of one he considers most persua-
sive that I have found powerful specifically against 
theists convinced of the divine authority of only their 
tradition’s scriptures: Different traditions’ scriptures 
contradict each other and cannot all be true; therefore, 
some of them must be false (30-31). I typically add 
and emphasize that most people are indoctrinated into 
their faith by accidents of birth, and that if they were 
born into different traditions, they would have faith 
that those were the only correct ones; I also add that 
most faith traditions make the same types of moves, 
such as discouraging doubt, appealing to the incom-
prehensibility of the divine, waffling between literal 
and metaphorical interpretations, etc., adding that to 
any member of religion A, religion B’s explanations 
seem silly, and vice versa. Again, the Manual does 
not engage with traditional arguments in philosophy 
of religion, but it is loaded with original arguments 
against the rationality of faith. Boghossian provides 
his army of atheist proselytizers with an ample cache 
of intellectual weapons, including astute summaries 
of the virus’s standard defense mechanisms and clever 
strategies for dealing with them.
Another instructive element of the Manual is the in-
clusion throughout several of its chapters of actual 
samples of what Boghossian calls “interventions,” di-
alogues in which he plays the Socratic role with folks 
afflicted with the faith contagion, displaying for his 
street epistemologists the ways in which certain moves 
work and how others can fail. If nothing else, Boghos-
sian seems honest insofar as some of these dialogues 
are admitted failures that he analyzes in search of 
self-improvement, as a way of walking budding street 
epistemologists through the ongoing training. I found 
these records of his conversations with the faithful the 
most entertaining. If nothing else, Boghossian does 
a very good job of modeling Socratic inquiry in his 
dialogues, particularly well even with folks who, on a 
good day, make Euthyphro look wise. 
The Manual begins with a Foreword from Michael 
Schermer followed by nine-chapters that make for 
a very easy, enjoyable, overall enlightening read, fol-
lowed by useful appendices, glossary, references, and 
an index, and each chapter is followed by endnotes 
and a “Dig Deeper” section in which Boghossian pro-
vides the reader with references to external items rel-
evant to that chapter, such as videos, books, articles, 
websites, organizations, camps, legal services, and the 
like, many of which are prefaced with explanatory re-
marks to guide the reader’s further explorations. Any 
minor objections notwithstanding, Boghossian’s A 
Manual for Creating Atheists is a worthwhile adven-
ture into Boghossian’s sobering vision.
